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Abstract 
Smart Grid (SG) provides enhancement to existing grids with two-way communication between 
the utility, sensors, and consumers, by deploying smart sensors to monitor and manage power 
consumption. However due to the vulnerability of SG, secure component authenticity necessitates robust 
authentication approaches relative to limited resource availability (i.e. in terms of memory and 
computational power). SG communication entails optimum efficiency of authentication approaches to avoid 
any extraneous burden. This systematic review analyses 27 papers on SG authentication techniques and 
their effectiveness in mitigating certain attacks. This provides a basis for the design and use of optimized 
SG authentication approaches.  
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1. Introduction  
Existing grids are enhanced in the case of smart grids (SGs) by the introduction of 
bilateral communication between consumers, utilities, and sensors, which in the case of smart 
sensors and meters enables monitoring and management of the consumption of electrical 
power [1, 2]. More advanced sensor solutions, e.g. Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), enable 
energy saving by re-routing power automatically, relative to consumer demand, facilitating 
reduced energy wastage and optimum stability, including error detection and reporting  
(e.g. during power outages), and faster diagnosis and troubleshooting to enable system 
restoration in the event of problems [3]. Advantages of SGs include reduced costs, less energy 
consumption (with the potential for reduced carbon emissions and other detrimental 
environmental impacts), fewer failures and quicker repair, and less potential for theft [4]. There 
are three main network types in SG architectures:  
 Wide Area Network (WAN) 
 Neighborhood Area Network (NAN): this gathers data from PMUs and smart meters for the 
utility company [3] 
 Home Area Network (HAN): within Home Energy Management System (HEMS), this 
facilitates data collection concerning consumption [5] 
Conventional systems’ security features [6-8] must be conserved by SG and IoT 
applications; indeed, they ought to be enhanced and improved, in terms of service and utility 
availability, integrity, and confidentiality [9]. Additionally, they must face new dangers associated 
with smart technologies, including such attacks as denial of service (DoS), replaying, spoofing, 
traffic analysis and eavesdropping [10, 11]. The effects of such attacks range from relatively 
innocuous (though by no means trivial) impacts such as passively collecting user electricity 
consumption data (e.g. for market research) to altering smart meter values (thus manipulating 
customer bills and power provider revenues), and even corrupting system utilities [12]. 
A review of SG authentication mechanisms by Bayindir et al. [4] evaluated the use of 
Kerberos, public key authentication, one-time password, biometric authentication, and  
identity-based authentication, but it did not relate the analysis to actual potential threats faced in 
real-world applications. Nevertheless, the authors found that password-based authentication 
fails to provide mutual authentication, although it is useful in access control; and that  
certificate-less authentication is appropriate for SG authentication. 
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SG multicast authentication one-time signature schemes were analyzed by Lei et 
al.[12], in terms of the parameters of suitability, key management effectiveness, and storage 
cost. The study found that the optimum theoretical solution was Time-Valid One-Time Signature 
(TV-OTS), a technique whereby signature-generating and private keys are intermittently 
refreshed, but more empirical research is necessary to substantiate this solution.  
Various SG cryptography algorithms and associated key generation techniques were 
evaluated by A. Kumar and A. Agarwal [13]. The security of such solutions fundamentally 
depends on key randomness. It was found that in SG applications, lightweight algorithms are 
optimal due to system limitations, as they have lower memory requirements, and asymmetric 
algorithms are more germane, while symmetric algorithms are better solutions for the encryption 
of messages during the authentication process. 
This paper systematically reviews literature concerning SG authentication approaches 
in order to identity optimized solutions for SG components relative to attacks, and analyses their 
effectiveness in mitigating certain attacks to provide a basis for the design and use of optimized 
SG authentication solution. Section 2 explains the research method. Section 3 sets out and 
analyses the results, while section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Research Method   
This systematic review includes papers on SG authentication techniques published 
during the period 2010 and June 2018 in Springer Link (Springer), IEEE Xplore (IEEE), and 
ScienceDirect (Elsevier) libraries. Searching utilized the combination of keywords to yield hits 
pertinent to the research questions, subjected to inclusion and exclusion criteria phases, as 
shown and explained in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Inclusion and exclusion process flow 
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2.1. Research Questions 
The following key research questions guided this systematic review. 
 
2.1.1. RQ1: What SG Authentication Approaches Exist? 
This question targets particular techniques developed and tested in primary studies to 
give robust SG authentication solutions, with the objective of investigating common techniques 
and security models applied to enhance SG authentication. 
 
2.1.2. RQ2: What Attack Types are Mitigated by these Authentication Approaches?  
As explained previously, SG components are susceptible to numerous forms of attack 
(e.g. DoS and malicious software attacks). This research question aims to explore the application 
of identified authentication approach to prevent or manage common attacks on SG systems. 
 
2.2.    Search Process  
2.2.1. Digital Libraries Search  
The selected digital libraries (Springer Link, IEEE Xplore, and ScienceDirect) were 
searched for recent papers (published during 2010-June, 2018) on SG authentication, utilizing 
Scopus indexing, which purports to comprise the greatest database of peer-reviewed articles. 
Direct searching with key search terms was undertaken as shown in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1. Search Keywords 
Keywords Closely matched keywords Combination using AND/OR (key string) 
Smart grid Electrical grid 
Smart grid AND effective AND authentication technique OR key 
management (S1) 
Electrical grid AND effective AND authentication technique OR key 
management (S2) 
Authentication 
techniques 
Key management, digital 
signatures 
Smart grid AND effective OR high quality AND digital signatures 
(S3) 
Electrical grid AND effective OR high quality AND digital signatures 
(S4) 
Effective High quality 
Smart grid AND high quality AND authentication technique OR key 
management (S5) 
Electrical grid AND high quality AND authentication technique OR 
key management (S6) 
 
 
2.2.2. Selection Execution 
All of the searched libraries yielded differing volumes of articles using the key strings. 
Articles identified (i.e. hits) were compiled in CSV spreadsheets, then a script code was 
executed to identify duplications and intersections between the articles. The consequent mass 
of articles was refined by further selection, including examining the relevance of articles to the 
research questions based on their titles, which reduced the set to 664 by excluding studies not 
directly related to SG authentication techniques. 
The first and second authors (i.e. reviewers) were engaged to independently examine the 
664 articles with regard to the inclusion and exclusion criteria, again to exclude articles not directly 
evaluating SG authentication techniques or threat mitigation, this time based on reading their 
abstracts as well as titles. Outcomes were classed as relevant articles (Nra); conceivably relevant 
articles (Nca); and irrelevant articles (Nira). Articles excluded at this stage included those whose 
abstracts did not specify authentication techniques [14] or the mitigation of threats [15]. It was 
noted by the reviewers that some authentication techniques had been replicated in numerous 
studies by the same authors, with varying objectives or experimental methods; in such cases the 
most recent study relevant to the study inclusion and exclusion criteria was used.  
A total of 35 and 31 articles were considered relevant (Nra) by the first and second 
reviewers (respectively), then they reviewed their pooled Nra, Nira, and Nca selections to judge 
37 as relevant (Nra). To avoid any possibility of bias, the outcomes of the reviewers’ 
assessments were conveyed to a third reviewer for checking, and all reviewers subsequently 
met to verify the exclusion of articles considered irrelevant by one or more reviewers, 
subsequently yielding a final collection of articles with consensus among the reviewers on their 
relevance to this study. As displayed in Figure 1. Finally, full-text analysis led to a total of  
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33 articles. Quality assessment criteria were subsequently used to guarantee the rigor and 
validity of the primary studies and 6 papers was eliminated. 
 
2.2.3. Quality Assessment  
The quality assessment decreased bias in article selection and made sure rigorous 
criteria were used in assessing the selected articles’ quality as described in Table 2. Quality 
scoring used the following criteria: Yes indicates that an article unambiguously meets the 
assessment criteria (and thus is scored 1); No indicates that an article unequivocally fails to 
meet the criteria (scored 0); and Indistinctive refers to doubt in whether the article meets the 
criteria, necessitating more detailed analysis or correspondence with the author(s) to seek 
clarification or partially meet the criteria (scored 0.5). Studies that scored over 50% in the 
qualitative assessment are listed in Table 3. 
 
2.3. Extracting Information 
The extraction of information relevant to the research questions concerned: 
 The SG component authentication technique. 
 The attack the technique is intended to mitigate. 
 The system vulnerabilities addressed. 
 
 
Table 2. Criteria for Quality Assessment 
S/N Question Answer 
Q1 Is the research purpose clearly stated in the article?  Yes/ No/ Indistinctive 
Q2 Does the paper topic cover the power generation domain? Yes/ No/ Indistinctive 
Q3 Does the paper use a mechanism, tool, framework, or methodology? Yes/ No/ Indistinctive 
Q4 Is the mechanism, tool, framework, or methodology used in the paper relevant 
to the research questions? 
Yes/ No/ Indistinctive 
Q5 Are the authentication approaches fully defined? Yes/ No/ Indistinctive 
Q6 Are the authentication approaches verified? Yes/ No/ Indistinctive 
 
 
Table 3. Results of Qualitative Assessment 
Article ID Source Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Total 
Percentage 
compliance 
PS1 [16] IEEE 2012 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS2 [17] IEEE 2012 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 5.5 91.66 
PS3 [18] IEEE 2017 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 4.5 83.33 
PS4 [19] IEEE 2013 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 5.5 .75 
PS5 [20] IEEE 2015 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 4 83.33 
PS6 [21]  IEEE 2011 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 5.5 66.66 
PS7 [22] IEEE 2013 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 5.5 91.67 
PS8 [23] IEEE 2011 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 4 66.66 
PS9 [24] IEEE 2011 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS10 [25] IEEE 2013 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.5 58.33 
PS11 [26] IEEE 2014 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 5.5 91.67 
PS12 [27] IEEE 2017 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS13 [28] IEEE 2012 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 5.5 91.67 
PS14 [29] IEEE 2018 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS15 [30] IEEE 2018 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS16 [31] Science Direct 2017 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS17 [32] Science Direct 2016 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS18 [33] Science Direct 2018 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS19 [34] Science Direct 2015 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS20 [35] Science Direct 2018 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS21 [36] Science Direct 2018 1 1 1  1 0.5 5.5 91.67 
PS22 [31] Springer Link 2016 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 5 83.34 
PS23 [37] Springer Link 2016 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS24 [38] Springer Link 2013 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.5 5 83.34 
PS25 [39] Springer Link 2017 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS26 [40] Springer Link 2015 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 100 
PS27 [41] IEEE 2014 1 1 1 1 1 11 6 100 
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3.    Results and Analysis  
3.1. SG authentication Approaches (RQ1) 
Answering RQ1 was directly related to analyzing authentication techniques of SG; a 
concise summary is presented in Table 4. Subsequently, the identified techniques were 
categorized into approaches as described in Table 5. Almost every included study deployed 
some degree of cryptography in authentication, but we considered the approaches to be based 
on cryptography if they used known techniques of cryptography, including hash function, 
symmetric key encryption, and Diffie-Hellman. If they did not use such techniques, they were 
classified under the general category of the approach used, as declared by the authors. For 
instance, if password techniques were used for authentication of SG components with an 
encryption technique in a constituent phase, the approach was classed as a password-based 
one. Exceptional cases that could not be easily classified on this basis were included in the 
hybrid encryption category, which included primary studies using no clear classification of 
approach or multiple encryption techniques (e.g. public and symmetric key encryption) as 
illustrated in Table 5 and Figure 2. The categories of cryptographic approaches deployed in SG 
authentication are explained below. 
 
 
Table 4. Smart Grid Authentication Approaches 
Article ID Authentication approach Classification 
PS1 [16] Biometric fingerprint authentication  Biometric 
PS2 [17] Broadcasting symmetric key encryption using MKB (media key block) to 
distribute and extract the keys  
Cryptography 
PS3 [18] Cryptography symmetric key encryption using a hash function to distribute keys Cryptography 
PS4 [19] Scalable and automated password-changing approach Password 
PS5 [20] TESLA-based source authentication  Cryptography 
PS6 [21] Cryptography using pair-wise keys, including message authentication code to 
check key integrity  
Cryptography 
PS7 [22] Signature-based using (TV-OTS) Signature-based 
PS8 [23] Cryptographic mutual authentication and two secret values to ensure non-
repudiation and integrity  
Cryptography 
PS9 [24] Cryptography using hash-based message authentication code and Diffie-Hellman 
key establishment  
Cryptography 
PS10 [25] The secure chip that stores the provider credentials such as IP address, provider 
address, and associated phone number in a file included in the chip  
Hardware 
PS11 [26] Cryptography using Merkel trees depending on a hash function Cryptography 
PS12 [27] Hardware authentication approach using ring oscillator physically unclonable 
function (RO PUF) to derive keys  
Hardware 
PS13 [28] Password and symmetric key, and one hash function to ensure key integrity Password 
PS14 [29] Authentication approach based on certificateless cryptosystem  Cryptography 
PS15 [30] Lightweight authentication approach using elliptic curve Cryptography 
PS16 [31] Cryptography using Diffie-Hellman key establishment and timestamps Cryptography 
PS17 [32] Cryptography based on lightweight Diffie-Hellman Cryptography 
PS18 [33] Authentication approach using elliptic curve cryptography Cryptography 
PS19 [34] Cryptography using PUF to derive keys Hardware 
PS20 [35] Enhanced elliptic curve cryptography-based authentication Cryptography 
PS21 [36] Lightweight elliptic curve approach using third party Cryptography 
PS22 [31] Cryptography using public key scheme with password data validation at server Password 
PS23 [37] Source authentication based on the concept of inf-TESLA  Cryptography 
PS24 [38] Cryptography using a hash function with a secret key shared between parties, 
hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) 
Cryptography 
PS25 [39] Cryptography used a key exchanged protocol based on chaotic maps Cryptography 
PS26 [40] Signature and secret key based efficient authentication protocol against pollution 
attack (EAPA) 
Signature 
PS27 [41] Merkle-tree-based authentication scheme for SG Cryptography 
 
 
3.1.1. Cryptographic-Based Approaches 
The greatest number of studies fitting into a single category was for those using hybrid 
encryption for SG authentication, with 18.5% of primary studies, comprising 27.7% of cryptography-
based approaches, as in PS5, PS6, PS14, PS23, and PS24. These approaches sought to conserve 
limited computational resources in SG components (i.e. energy and power). For instance, Timed 
Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) was used by PS5 and PS23, with the 
distinguishing characteristics of less overhead packet communication, greater toleration of packet loss, 
and lower computation overhead. TESLA is based on one-way chains generating symmetric keys that 
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are subsequently revealed in reversed order, with messages being buffered prior to authentication. It is 
thus of utility for SG components that need to be generally synchronized for speed-efficient assimilation 
of energy data rather than real-time data processing speed, as in PS5. For high data transfer volumes 
and longer durations of communication, PS23 suggested the use of inf-TESLA (i.e. for multicast 
streaming data), which deploys dual key chain method to facilitate improved streaming authentication 
continuity, preventing resynchronization and signing lag times and other associated problems.  
 
 
Table 5. Frequency Distribution of Authentication Approaches 
Approach Frequency Percentage 
Cryptography-based Classification and mapping   
Hybrid encryption  5 
66.67 
Hash function  4 
Diffie-Hellman 3 
Elliptic curve 4 
Chaotic maps 1 
Broadcast encryption 1 
Password-based 3 11.11 
Hardware-based 3 11.11 
Signature-based 2 7.40 
Biometric-based 1 3.70 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Frequency distribution of authentication approaches 
 
 
The approach developed by PS6 for SG authentication used symmetric key encryption, 
with the sharing of pairwise keys between SG components, whereby all transmissions are 
encrypted prior to transmission; this approach was intended to optimize power efficiency (i.e. to 
function with the low computational power of SG components). PS14 used an authentication 
technique deploying a cryptosystem with certificate-less, using instead a blend of identity-based 
cryptography and public key technique to avoid the prohibitive cost of public key infrastructure 
(PKI) for private key generation, due to using a key generation center (KGC). PS24 used hash-
based message authentication code (HMAC) and symmetric key encryption for SG components’ 
mutual authentication, according to which components’ authentication requires multiple proofs.  
Hash-based approaches for authentication were deployed in PS3, PS8, PS11, and 
PS27, accounting for 22.22% of systematically reviewed primary studies, and 14.81% of those 
classified as cryptography-based. PS3 and PS8 used one-way hash function to address 
vulnerability to impersonation attack and repudiation attack (respectively). PS11 and PS27 used 
Merkle tree (a binary tree consisting of lead tokens, with each internal tree nodes being a hash 
of the right and left child nodes) for robust SG component authentication.  
Elliptic curve approaches were declared by four of the systematically reviewed studies: 
PS15, PS35, PS37, and PS38. These accounted for 14.81% of selected primary studies, and 
22.22% of cryptography-based techniques. PS15 used SM2 elliptical curve for SG components’ 
mutual authentication, initiated with the connection between terminals and the SG center. The 
system monitored connections to detect time-out status, which prompted session closure. This 
provide efficient and fast computation and limited power drag. PS18 used elliptic curve to address 
limitations identified in [36] pertaining to perfect secrecy and vulnerability in terms of the  
Canetti–Krawczyk model. Similarly, PS20 tested an improved version of an elliptic curve used in a 
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previous study, in this case another primary paper: PS15. A lightweight elliptic curve technique 
was proposed by PS21 that used third-party registration of participants in order to begin 
authentication, with the authentication process ending after the exchange of the key session.  
Diffie-Hellman authentication comprised 11.11% of systematically reviewed studies, and 
16.66% of those using cryptography-based techniques (PS9, PS16, and PS17). Hashing code 
and Diffie-Hellman exchange protocol was used in PS9 for mutual authentication and session 
key sharing. Using Diffie-Hellman, PS16 apply the concept of discrete logarithm problems to 
authenticate the transmitted messages. Similarly, advanced encryption standard (AES) and 
Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) encryption were used in conjunction with Diffie-Hellman 
technique in PS17. Broadcast encryption and chaotic maps were used for key distribution only 
in PS2 and PS25, respectively.  
 
3.1.2. Password-Based Approaches 
Password-based approaches were used for authentication in 11.11% of included studies 
(PS4, PS13, and PS22). PS4 presented SCAPACH, a password-based authentication technique 
that generates novel, short-lived passwords automatically when initiating every session of 
authentication, using parameters including device ID, geographical location, and local time etc. 
SG-MCPEAK protocol was tested in PS13, with symmetric keys for multilayer password 
authentication. SSCA and PSCAb protocols of password authentication were tested in PS22, the 
former of which deployed symmetric key encryption, while the latter used public key encryption.  
 
3.1.3. Hardware-Based Approaches 
Hardware-based approaches accounted for 11.11% of systematically reviewed studies 
(PS10, PS12 and PS19). PS10 provided SG component authentication with improved data 
processing performance, mobility, and security using a smart chip integrated with multiple 
reliable crypto algorithms, including hash function and public and symmetric keys. Physically 
Unclonable Function (PUF) was implemented with Xilinx Spartan 3E FPGA boards to provide 
authentication using end-to-end hardware by PS12. Microprocessor integration with PUF offers 
unique identity for SG component devices. In PS19, PUF was also used for a hardware solution 
meeting the needs for Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMIs) authentication.  
 
3.1.4. Signature-Based Approaches 
Signature-based authentication approaches accounted for 7.4% of included studies 
(PS7and PS26). Individual signatures were created using Time-Valid One-Time-Signature  
(TV-OTS) in PS7, with new secret keys periodically initiated by Hash of Random Subsets 
(HORS). This authentication technique provided multicasting, secure, real-time, dynamic 
authentication. While PS26 might be considered to be a hybrid technique of encryption, on 
balance the reviewers classified it as a signature-based method due to the relative scarcity of 
studies using signatures during authentication. PS26 deployed message authentication codes 
(MAC) in addition to homomorphic signature for authentication, the latter of which signed data 
packets when initiated at source, while MAC generated unique tags for every data packet.  
 
3.1.5. Biometric-Based Approaches 
Biometric-based approaches accounted for 3.7% of included studies. PS1 investigated 
the use of multiple authentication approaches in modern networks, with AES for the privacy of 
fingerprinting used in authentication of SG system users. Database storage of fingerprints 
included categorization into rich minutiae and sparse fingerprint types. 
 
3.2. Mitigated Threats (RQ2) 
Answering RQ2 involved analyzing types of attacks and threats mitigated by the studied 
authentication approaches. Table 6 lists the foremost varieties of attacks identified, which were 
studied in terms of frequency and distribution. Figure 3 displays the mitigated attacks’ frequency 
distribution. The most common types of attacks mitigated are, in descending order: MiTM, replay, 
impersonation, eavesdropping, brute force, dictionary, spoofing, repudiation, and other. The ‘other; 
category collectively accounts for 15%, denoting the fourth rank, but each constituent threat in this 
group was considered in only one systematically reviewed study, comprising data forgery, DoS, 
information leakage, insider, modification, pollution, and quantum computer.  
With 21.66% of all attacks, MiTM was the most common mitigated attack. Some 
analysts note that MiTM and impersonation attacks are fundamentally similar, but they were 
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classified as distinct categories in this paper following the example of the taxonomies used by 
most of the primary studies analyzed; for instance, PS6, PS14, PS15, PS16, and PS21 have 
particular techniques of MiTM mitigation and others for impersonation attack. The latter was 
also commonly studied in its own right by 16.66% of primary studies. For both impersonation 
and MiTM attacks, the main aim of authentication is to prevent unauthorized (i.e. malicious) 
components such as fake smart meters from imitating genuine components, in order to prevent 
unauthorized access by third parties attempting to access SG components’ data during 
exchange, to avoid damage including stopping or reducing the quality of SG network 
performance, corrupting or dropping data packets, or initiating secondary attacks within the 
system, such as DoS attacks and data flooding.  
Replay attack comprised 18.36% of the total of identified attacks in included studies 
(PS13, PS14, PS15, PS16, PS17, PS18, PS20, PS21, PS25, P26 and PS27). Authentication 
approaches seeking to protect data transmission between SG components from replay attack 
seek to prevent attackers intercepting, modifying and replaying data. Eavesdropping accounted 
for 10% of attacks mitigated in included studies (PS4, PS5, PS12, PS15, PS17, and PS25), 
seeking to protect data from attackers recording transmission or listening to data exchanged 
between SG components, especially consumer applications and smart meters. Eavesdropping 
is essentially an issue of system privacy and is particularly important where it relates to 
attackers stealing sensitive data and customer identity, with potential for fraudulent use. 
 
 
Table 6. Threats Mitigated using Authentication Approaches 
S/N Reference Threat (attack)  
mitigated  
1 PS1 [16] Impersonation  
2 PS2 [17] Information leakage by crackers  
3 PS3 [18] Impersonation 
4 PS4 [19] Eavesdropping, brute force  
5 PS5 [20] Eavesdropping, MiTM 
6 PS6 [21] MiTM, impersonation 
7 PS7 [22] Brute force 
8 PS8 [23] Repudiation 
9 PS9 [24] Spoofing, MiTM 
10 PS10 [25] Impersonation, data forgery  
11 PS11 [26] Quantum computer 
12 PS12 [27] Eavesdropping, spoofing, MiTM 
13 PS13 [28] MiTM, off-line dictionary, replay  
14 PS14 [29] Impersonation, MiTM, repudiation, replay 
15 PS15 [30] Replay, impersonation, message injection, MiTM, eavesdropping 
16 PS16 [31] Impersonation, MiTM, replay 
17 PS17 [32] Replay, MiTM, eavesdropping 
18 PS18 [33] Impersonation, MiTM, replay 
19 PS19 [34] Spoofing 
20 PS20 [35] Replay, modification, DoS, insider 
21 PS21 [36] Replay, impersonation, MiTM 
22 PS22 [31] Off-line dictionary 
23 PS23 [37] MiTM 
24 PS24 [38] Brute force, impersonation 
25 PS25 [39] Eavesdropping, dictionary, replay 
26 PS26 [40] Pollution (inject fake data packets), replay 
27 PS27 [41] Replay, modification 
 
 
Spoofing, dictionary, and brute force attacks each accounted for 5% of attacks 
considered by the primary studies. SG entities used mutual authentication to avoid spoofing 
attacks, inhibiting attackers from accessing encryption (and/ or decryption) keys, and from 
disrupting authentication mechanisms. Dictionary and brute force attacks were mitigated using 
passwords for authentication between SG components and users, including utility companies, 
data aggregation points, and gateways. Tables are typically used to store passwords, with 
related authentication approaches preventing unauthorized access. Other attacks collectively 
accounted for 15% of attacks mitigated, comprising data forgery, DoS, information leakage, 
insider, modification, pollution, and quantum computer attacks.  
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Figure 3. Frequency distribution of threats mitigation in smart grid 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
A total of 27 primary studies were systematically reviewed in this study, revealing that 
most researches deployed cryptographic techniques for SG component authentication, including 
hash function, symmetric key encryption, and Diffie-Hellman. The most common attack 
mitigated by the approaches was MiTM (21.66%), with impersonation attack being the third 
most common (16.66%). In both of these attack types, SG authentication approaches seek to 
inhibit access by impostor smart meters and thus prevent unauthorized third party access to 
data exchanged within the SG, avoiding damage including corrupting or dropping data packets.  
The second most common attack was replay attack (18.33%), followed by 
eavesdropping (10%), which pertain to protecting customer identity and avoiding fraudulent use 
or manipulation of consumer data. Brute force, dictionary, and spoofing attacks each comprised 
5% of attacks considered in systematically reviewed studies, while small numbers of studies 
considered other forms of attack (e.g. modification, insider, pollution, data forgery, DoS, 
information leakage, and quantum computer), collectively accounting 15%. While this research 
accomplished its objectives, it was limited by the relatively small number of directly relevant 
papers, and replication of this research with more extensive studies addressing new research 
questions concerning privacy and security attributes are recommended, to increase in-depth 
knowledge of SG security.  
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